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Monetary stability in economic development
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Stable domestic and external monetary
conditions are a necessary but not a sufficient
condition for economic development.
Monetary stability makes development
possible. But no tricks of monetary policy—
certainly not artificially low interest or
exchange rates, despite the claims that are
sometimes made for them—can truncate the
long, slow grind of accumulating human and
other capital and building economic,
political and social institutions that leads to
sustained increases in incomes. Monetary
instability—high and unstable inflation,
balance of payments problems and currency
inconvertibility, a wildly fluctuating external
value of domestic currency, high costs and
difficulties of access to debt by credit-worthy
borrowers—is hugely damaging to
development, and can block its prospects
while it persists.
The crucial question about the choice of
exchange rate regime—for a small country,
the choice between monetary integration
with a larger country or region and monetary
independence—is therefore whether it is
likely to help or to hinder the maintenance of
stable monetary conditions over long
periods.
Here I will discuss mainly the choice of
exchange rate regime in the larger island
countries of the Southwest Pacific which
currently have independent currencies
managed by their own central banks, and
whether the development prospects of these
countries would be better if they opted for
use of an external currency. I have the case of
Papua New Guinea most strongly in my
mind, but much the same issues arise in
Solomon Islands, Fiji, Vanuatu and the
smaller economies. The smaller the economy
the weaker the case for monetary
independence, so if it cannot be made for
Papua New Guinea, it is unlikely to be
compelling in any other of the island
economies.
This paper addresses four issues. The
first is the identification of the regimes
amongst which a choice can sensibly be
made. The second is whether the use of an
external currency would create a ‘currency
area’ that would be more helpful to economic
development than monetary independence.
The third is whether, if monetary
independence were likely to be optimal in
theory, it would be superior in practice to
integration into an external currency area,
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given the likely qualities of monetary policy
at home and in the best alternative monetary
area. The three issues are interrelated.
This paper supplements recent work by
Duncan (2005). It supports Duncan’s
conclusion, that the South Pacific economies
would provide themselves with a firmer
monetary base for economic development if
they were anchored firmly to an external
currency. It provides some additional
information and analysis that strengthens
the case beyond that made by Duncan,
arguing for a single or series of South Pacific
currency boards linked to the Australian
dollar or, better still, for all of the countries
concerned, but more difficult to achieve, to a
new currency formed through monetary
union between Australia and New Zealand.
Currency and exchange rate
regime choices
Economic exchange is facilitated by use of a
common unit of account. The use of separate
currencies in different countries and regimes
raises transactions costs in international
trade and investment. So why doesn’t the
whole world use a single currency?
There have been times when large parts
of the world did use what was in effect the
same currency. The purest form of global
monetary union was the use of the ‘gold
standard’ by many countries throughout
much of the nineteenth century and into the
early part of the twentieth century. Many
countries applied a strict monetary regime,
in which their monetary authorities (public
or private) converted gold into domestic
currency at a fixed exchange rate and
undertook to convert whatever domestic
currency was offered for sale or purchase at
that exchange rate. The supply of domestic
currency could only be increased if the
country ran a balance of payments surplus,
which would increase the domestic banking
system’s holdings of gold. If a currency area
ran a balance of payments deficit, its
holdings of gold would decline, forcing the
contraction of the domestic money supply.
With many currencies pegged firmly to gold,
they were in practice pegged to each other.
The currency boards that were used in
many colonies until well after the breakdown
of the gold standard in the 1930s and 1940s
worked in much the same way. As an early
example of a currency board-type
mechanism, up until the Great Depression
of the 1930s Australian banks would issue
Australian currency that was backed by gold
or by reserves of pounds sterling, the latter
currency itself being based on the gold
standard. Fiji had a currency board system
backed by the pound sterling until about the
time of independence. The monetary
authority issued distinctive Fiji notes and
coins, but these were all fully backed by
pounds sterling. If there were a balance of
payments surplus, the banking system’s
holdings of foreign exchange would rise, and
with it the domestic money supply. This
would expand domestic demand and
economic activity, in the process correcting
the payments surplus. These mechanisms
would work in reverse with a balance of
payments deficit. There was free, two-way
convertibility of the Fiji dollar into foreign
exchange. The exchange rate of the Fiji dollar
against the pound was firmly fixed.
Vanuatu was a special case, with the
French authorities running a currency board
backed by the French franc, and the British
authorities accepting the Australian dollar
as legal tender. The people of the old
condominium of the New Hebrides could
choose to exchange goods and services in
Pacific francs or in Australian dollars. The
two currencies were used side by side in the
markets of Vila. If one was more inflationary
and vulnerable to devaluation than the other,
people would be inclined to hold the stronger
currency as a store of value, so the relative
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amounts of the two currencies on issue in
the condominion varied over time.
The gold standard was effective in
reducing transactions costs in and
facilitating international trade and
investment. It kept interest rates reasonably
close together in countries with similarly
credit-worthy borrowers—with lower
interest rate penalties for less well known
and smaller economies than emerged in the
later era of independent currencies. There
was no scope for the government to expand
economic activity by printing money, thus
removing what was to become a persistent
source of monetary instability. There was no
room for protracted balance of payments
crises of the kind that characterised many
developing economies in the era of
independent central banks.
The gold standard’s disadvantage was
that a country would be forced into
immediate monetary contraction whenever
it had an external payments deficit and (less
commonly seen as a problem) into potentially
inflationary expansion when it had a
payments surplus. This imposed costs of
adjustment to phenomena that might turn
out to be temporary, and sudden change on
economies that might have experienced less
stress from more gradual adjustment
financed by some domestic monetary
expansion.
Papua New Guinea and Solomon
Islands simply used the Australian dollar
until independent central banks were
established around the time of independence.
This carried most of the disadvantages and
advantages of the currency board. In the
absence of domestic currency issue, the
profits from the note issue went to the
Australian rather than the domestic
authorities.
In the industrialised world, after the
Second World War, an attempt was made to
re-establish some of the advantages of fixed
exchange rates on a global scale that had been
provided by the gold standard, but with
provision for more gradual adjustment when
countries had external payments
imbalances, and for occasional adjustments
of exchange rates when their economic
conditions had moved a long way out of line
from their trading partners. Within the
‘Bretton Woods System’, which operated
until the early 1970s, independent central
banks in the major industrialised economies
were able to exercise discretion on rates of
monetary expansion. The exercise of this
discretion in very different ways in different
countries—some applying much more
expansionary and inflationary policies than
others—led to the breakdown of the Bretton
Woods arrangements, and the movement of
most large economies and eventually others
as well to more-or-less freely floating
exchange rates.
Once the major currencies were floating
against each other, smaller currencies could
no longer choose to have a fixed exchange
rate against all of their economic partners’
currencies. They could fix their exchange rate
against one external currency—rigidly
through a currency board, as the Hong Kong
monetary authorities chose to do against the
United States dollar in 1984; or as a matter of
policy that could be varied from time to time,
as Papua New Guinea did against the
Australian dollar for the first couple of years
after independence. Or they could fix their
currency’s exchange rate more or less firmly
against a basket of currencies. Or they could
float their currencies, allowing external value
to vary with supply and demand, with the
monetary authorities undertaking
transactions to influence the exchange rate
heavily, occasionally or not at all.
The breakdown of the global system of
more-or-less fixed exchange rates increased
transactions costs in international trade and
investment. This was most damaging to
relatively small economies which sought to
maintain monetary independence. While
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there were deep international markets for the
currencies of the major industrialised
countries, much knowledge of their value and
how it was changing from time to time, and
well-developed mechanisms for hedging
exchange rate risk, there was little trade in or
understanding of the value of currencies of
small developing economies. Exchange risk
was a significant deterrent to trade and
investment with the small economies—the
more so for economies with badly managed
independent currencies.
These realities were not well understood
at the times of independence in the South
Pacific countries. Each of the larger South
Pacific countries chose full monetary
independence. In practice, the independent
monetary systems were closely similar to
those of Australia and New Zealand at the
time: a central bank with the full range of
powers usually available to industrialised
countries’ monetary authorities, including
powers to set the rate at which domestic
currency was converted into foreign
exchange, power to create money for lending
to the government, and powers and
mechanisms for controls on conversion
domestic currency into foreign exchange.
In Papua New Guinea at least, there was
considerable discussion of the relative merits
of alternative monetary systems around the
time of independence. The ultimate choice of
monetary independence, managed by a fully
fledged central bank, was strongly
influenced by sentiment, encouraged by
advisers from the Reserve Bank of Australia,
that this was a normal and therefore
necessary aspect of political independence.
The global monetary system has changed
a great deal since these decisions were made
thirty years ago. Movements of capital across
national borders have become much larger
and more volatile. Amongst other things, this
has made it harder and more costly for
central banks to enforce exchange controls
or preferred exchange rates for their domestic
currencies. Economic crises in many
countries have demonstrated the risks of
domestic monetary expansion in response
to domestic or external macro-economic
problems. There is greater awareness of the
damage to economic development that comes
with high inflation, exchange rate instability
and a high supply price of investment.
So now is a good time—better late than
never—to review fundamentally the South
Pacific economies’ choices of monetary
systems and exchange rate regimes.
The most basic choice—now and thirty
years ago—is whether to maintain a fully
independent monetary system, managed by
a central bank with the full range of powers;
or to use an external currency directly
(‘dollarisation’); or to establish a currency
board, which issues domestic currency under
rules that tightly constrain domestic
monetary expansion and the exchange rate
of the currency.
Whatever the basic choice amongst these
three alternatives, there are many subsidiary
decisions to be made about the way in which
the system is managed.
If the choice of a fully independent
monetary system were confirmed, the
subsequent policy decisions would include
the choice of exchange rate regime (freely
floating, pegged against a particular currency
or a basket, or somewhere in between). They
would include choice on the degree to which
central bank decisions were to be independent
of government, and the mechanisms through
which the preferred extent of independence
was to be secured. They would include choice
of objectives of monetary policy—low
inflation, or stable domestic economic activity,
or exchange rate stability, or some
combination of these and other goals.
If a decision were taken to use an external
currency, a choice would need to be made
among possible currencies.
If a currency board were chosen, much
would hang on decisions on whether the
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board were able to lend at all to the
government. A crucial decision would need
to be made on the currency against which
the domestic unit was to be pegged.
The theory of optimal currency
areas
Should the South Pacific economies continue
to maintain full monetary independence, or
would it be economically optimal to integrate
some of them with each other or with other
currencies into an ‘optimal currency area’?
The economic theory emphasises four
factors which determine whether it is
economically advantageous (‘optimal’) for
two or more countries or regions to be joined
by use of a single currency (Mundell 1961).
The first consideration is the effect of the
sharing of currencies on transactions costs.
The gains from monetary union will be
greater the greater the proportion of
international trade and investment
transactions that the members conduct with
each other. For most of the South Pacific, this
makes Australia (or Australia and New
Zealand if these economies were ever joined
in a single monetary area) a prime target for
monetary union. Transactions costs with the
world as a whole re less if they are conducted
in a currency that is widely known and
understood. The Australian dollar does not
fair badly on this criterion (being one of the
half dozen or so most traded currencies), but
if this were the only factor, a stronger case
could be made for the United States dollar.
Transactions costs argue strongly against full
monetary independence for a small
developing economy: most potential trade
and investment partners will know little
about the currency and will therefore apply
a risk premium to any transaction in which
it plays a part. Not even the best known of
the independent South Pacific currencies, the
Papua New Guinea kina, has its value
quoted continuously in the standard sources
of international financial information, or
daily in the financial media of any
industrialised country.
Second, countries are more likely to form
part of an optimal currency area if they are
subject to similar or at least positively
correlated shocks. The most important external
shocks felt by South Pacific countries are
fluctuations in the terms of trade, most
importantly with fluctuations in the prices of
mineral and agricultural commodities on
world markets.  Duncan and Xu (2000) and
Xu (1999) have shown that the correlations
between the movements of Papua New Guinea
and Australian terms of trade are close
enough to make some case that the two
economies are members of an optimal
currency area. The correlation has become
closer in the early twenty first century, with
the relative importance of minerals and
energy in exports rising in both countries.
Both economies also receive domestic
shocks, which are not correlated. In
Australia, the monetary expansions and
asset booms of the late 1980s and early years
of the twenty-first century had significant
destabilising effects. The domestic shocks are
larger in Papua New Guinea: the civil war
in Bougainville; the periodic macroeconomic
instability due to undisciplined government
fiscal deficits from time to time through the
1990s. If Australia and Papua New Guinea
were joined in a single currency area,
Australian domestic shocks are unlikely to
be significant sources of destabilisation in
Papua New Guinea, especially under the
steadier fiscal and monetary policies in
Australia since the recession of 1991–92.
Real domestic shocks from episodes of civil
disorder or natural disaster are going to be
damaging in Papua New Guinea whatever
the monetary system, but being part of a larger
currency area would prevent the
compounding of the initial shock by domestic
monetary instability. The damaging domestic
108
PACIFIC ECONOMIC BULLETIN
Feature
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 20 Number 3 2005 © Asia Pacific Press
shocks of the 1990s, deriving from excessive
money creation to fund government deficits,
would be avoided by well-structured
monetary integration
Third, an economy can readily form an
optimal currency area with another country
or region if it has a high degree of price
flexibility, or if labour and capital move freely
between the two economies. Papua New
Guinea now has a high degree of factor price
flexibility: regulated urban wages
(historically the most important price rigidity
in the economy) have become much less
significant since the abolition of the separate
urban minimum wage in 1992. Wage rigidity
is now less important in Papua New Guinea
than in any but a few economies.
The transactions costs of monetary
independence are high in an economy as
small as Papua New Guinea, and much larger
still elsewhere in the South Pacific. De Brouwer
(2000) has commented that the presence o f any
one of the three components of an optimal
currency area (the second, third and fourth
factors above), or the ppresence of any one of
them in some degree, would make the case for
some form of monetary union. Monetary
union of South Pacific countries (first of all
Papua New Guinea) with Australia would
be supported by all three elements of the case
for an optimal currency area. The case would
be weaker for monetary integration with other
industrialised economies.
The quality of monetary policy
The quality of independent monetary policy
depends on the strength of institutions, the
nature of government and the professional
capacity of the people who make the system
work. The quality of monetary policy within
a larger currency area depends on these
factors in the country which is managing
policy—in the case of use of the Australian
dollar or of an Australian dollar-based
currency board, on the quality of monetary
policy in Australia.
The Australian dollar now more than at
any time since monetary independence in
the South Pacific provides a non-inflationary
and relatively stable peg for South Pacific
economies. In the 1970s, a case could be made
that monetary integration with Australia
meant acceptance of damagingly high
inflation and interest rates, and that the
excellent conduct of independent monetary
policy in a South Pacific economy might do
better. Indeed, a case could be made that
sound macroeconomic policy in Papua New
Guinea in the decade and a half after
independence gave that country better
monetary outcomes than if it had used
Australian currency or a currency board
based on the Australian dollar.
But if Papua New Guinea secured some
benefits from relatively stable monetary
conditions and low inflation for some time
after Independence, these were small
compared with the large losses it suffered from
excessive fiscal deficits, monetary instability
and expansion, recurrent balance of payments
crises and currency inconvertibility in the
1990s. Monetary instability was one and
possibly the main economic policy cause of
the 1990s being Papua New Guinea
development’s lost decade. The outcomes over
this period were similarly poor in other major
South Pacific economies, and catastrophic in
Solomon Islands.
Substantial monetary reforms, including
the legislation of a high degree of
independence for the Bank of Papua New
Guinea secured a much firmer base for
monetary stability after 1999. Supported by
firmer fiscal policy since then, the monetary
outcomes have been much better in the early
years of the twenty-first century. Inflation has
fallen to the low levels of contemporary
industrialised economies. Interest rates have
fallen to economically reasonable levels.
External payments crises and currency
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inconvertibility have been avoided. The
exchange controls inherited from the Reserve
Bank of Australia (and abolished in Australia
in December 1983) have largely been removed.
This time of restored quality in Papua
New Guinea monetary policy may seem to
be one in which the advantages of use of an
external currency or of a currency board are
reduced, and therefore less necessary than
in the preceding decade. But while the quality
of policymaking recently has been high, as it
was in the early independence period, the
risks of monetary instability remain. The
costs of instability to development are
extremely high, and insurance against its
recurrence is valuable.
A way forward
Papua New Guinea and other South Pacific
countries with independent monetary
systems would receive large benefits from
monetary integration with Australia, through
reduction of international transactions costs,
and through removal of the risk of recurrence
of the extreme monetary instability of the
1990s. The currency areas so formed would
have the qualities of ‘optimal currency areas’
in unusually high degree.
Currency boards would seem to be the
practical form of monetary integration.
National entities would retain the symbolic
value of distinctive notes and coins. They
would secure the profits on the issue of notes
and coin without complex negotiation. The
benefits would be substantially the same as
those from ‘dollarisation’, so long as the rules
of the currency board made it impossible to
lend to governments, to change the exchange
rate under any circumstances, or to change
the rules of the currency board. The
irreversibility of the arrangements would be
more secure and more credible if the rules
were embedded in an international monetary
agreement.
The currency board could be based on
the Australian dollar. It would be better still
if it were based on a currency created by
monetary union between Australia and New
Zealand. Amongst other things, this would
be easier to embed in credibly binding
international agreements. I myself am of the
view that monetary union between Australia
and New Zealand would have advantages
for those two countries, including through
the entrenchment of central bank
independence (see also Grimes et al. 2000
for a New Zealand view). Considerable
convergen ce between objectives of and
approach to monetary policy in Australia
and New Zealand in the early years of the
twenty-first century has created a favourable
environment for consideration of these
matters. However, the issue of currency union
across the Tasman will be discussed
independently of the South Pacific monetary
issues, and can be put aside until it has
emerged as a real possibility.
Would it be better to have a multi-country
South Pacific currency board, or separate
national boards? The costs, especially in
terms of scarce professional personnel, are
not small, and there would be economies of
scale in having a single board. This would
not be inconsistent with issue of national
notes and coins in individual countries. But
the prospects of advantages of a single entity
are not so large that they should be allowed
to hold up progress on national boards, if
they become politically acceptable ahead of
a South Pacific arrangement.
It has to be acknowledged that the central
banks in the region, first of all in Papua New
Guinea, are at present amongst the most
effective public policy institutions in the
country. While good use could be made of
the human talent that they now utilise in
countries in which such talent and
experience is scarce and valuable, it would
be a pity if the institutional strength were
dissipated.
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It need not be. The central banks would
retain their roles in management of the
currency issue and in investment of the
foreign exchange reserves of the system. They
would retain important current roles in
supervision of financial institutions. And
alongside these supervisory responsibilities,
they could usefully continue to play a
valuable role in independent commentary on
the economy and economic policy.
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